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Abstract:  
Europe is perceived to be lagging behind the US in converting its academic results into 
economic outcomes. Using new survey data on European and US Technology Transfer 
Offices (TTOs), we find that differences in academic research, TTO staff and experience 
explain to a great extent the gap between the US and Europe in terms of the number of 
license agreements concluded. However, these factors account for only part of the 
difference in license income. We relate the difference in licensing income to differences in 
the organization and staffing of TTOs. Our analysis reveals that US TTOs do not attach 
more importance to generating revenue as an objective than their European counterparts. 
However, they employ more staff with experience in industry which explains some of the 
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 1 Introduction
\Compared to North America, the average university in Europe, generates far fewer
inventions and patents. This is largely due to a less systematic and professional man-
agement of knowledge and intellectual property by European universities."
(European Commission, 2007)
\Contrary to the \paradox"conjecture, European weaknesses reside both in its system
of scientic research and in a relatively weak industry."
(Dosi, Llerena, Sylos-Labini, 2006)
The European Commission (EC) has on several occasions1 stressed that Europe has been less
successful than the US in converting its academic results into economic outcomes. In a number
of documents it has advocated the importance of improving knowledge transfer between public
research institutions and third parties, including civil society and industry partners.
The argument behind the EC's concerns is that while European research institutions are good
at producing academic research outputs, they are not as good at transferring these outputs to the
economy. This argument is known as the \European Paradox".
A number of economic studies have contested the validity of the claim that European academic
institutions are good at producing scientic knowledge (of quality). Controlling for the relative
size of Europe and the US, Dosi et al. (2005) show that European countries lag signicantly
behind the US with regard to a number of indicators for academic quality, including the volume
of publications and article citations. Bauwens et al. (2008) point to the \massive" dominance of
American universities in the total sample of ISI Highly Cited Scientists. They highlight the fact
that the gap in research productivity between Europe and the US is due, in part, to a lack of
nancial resources made available for universities and research in Europe, but also to ineciencies
in the way these resources are managed. Aghion et al. (2009) argue that institutional autonomy
and competition account for the better academic research output of US universities when compared
to the output of their European counterparts.
Other studies have investigated whether it is true that the main weakness of European academic
institutions lies in translating scientic knowledge into innovations. Crespi et al. (2008) show that
while Europe lags behind the US in terms of university-owned patents, the gap becomes smaller
1See, for example, the Green Paper on Innovation (EC, 1995), the Third Report on Science and Technology
Indicators (EC, 2003) or the communication entitled "Improving knowledge transfer between research institutions
and industry across Europe - embracing open innovation - Implementing the Lisbon Agenda"(EC, 2007).
2when university-invented patents are taken into consideration. They analyzed the situation in six
major European countries and showed that two thirds of the patents with at least one university
inventor are not owned by universities. Similar results are found by Lissoni et al. (2008), who show
that in France, Italy, and Sweden most academic patents are not university-owned. These studies
all focus on patents as a measure of technology transfer. This was partly due to a lack of quality
data on licensing outcomes in Europe.
This study contributes to the understanding of whether a \European Paradox" actually exists
and, if so, what its causes could be. We tackle a specic aspect of university technology transfer
- the licensing activity of university technology transfer oces (TTOs) - to determine whether
US TTOs conclude more license agreements and earn more license revenue than their European
counterparts.
For this purpose, we complement public information available on US and European universities
with new survey data on university technology transfer oces in Europe and in the US. The survey
distributed to European TTOs included questions on quantitative outcomes (i.e. number of licenses
executed and license income) as well as other questions on objectives, metrics of success, stang
levels and composition. The target population was TTOs of universities located in Western Europe
whose researchers published more than 200 scientic articles between 2004-2006. The response
rate was 59.4%, with 211 answers coming from 15 countries. The survey distributed to US TTOs
was aimed at integrating the information available from the 2008 AUTM survey with questions on
objectives, metrics of success, and TTOs stang composition. The target population for the US
survey was selected according to the same publication parameters as was used for the European
survey, though we added as an additional condition having answered to the 2007 AUTM survey;
the response rate was 58%, with 89 answers.
In the rst part of the analysis, we found that, having controlled for measures of academic
scientic production and quality, academic orientation, demand for technology, national policies on
university intellectual property rights (professor's privilege), and TTO stang levels and experience,
European TTOs did not execute fewer licenses than their US counterparts. However, they earn
signicantly less revenue from licenses. These results were robust to dierent specications of the
econometric model.
In the second part of the analysis, we explored the dierences between Europe and the US that
might explain why European TTOs earn less income than their US colleagues. We focused on two
main hypotheses: 1) US TTOs place a greater emphasis on "generating revenue" as an objective;
32) US TTOs employ more sta who have experience in the industry sector and who might be more
skilled at negotiating the nancial clauses of licensing contracts.
Contrary to our expectations, US TTOs did not attach more importance than their European
counterparts to generating revenue when compared to other objectives such as local development
and faculty service. However, our proxies for TTO business experience had a positive and statisti-
cally signicant impact on the license revenue earned by TTOs, and their inclusion in our regressions
led to a decline in the license revenue dierential between the US and Europe.
In accordance with other studies investigating the \European Paradox", we considered Europe
as a homogeneous entity. However, we showed that there are signicant dierences among European
countries. Specically, Italy and Finland underperform the rest of Europe in terms of the number
of licenses, while Austria and Norway underperform the rest of Europe in terms of license income
earned. At the other end of the spectrum, countries like Switzerland and Belgium do signicantly
better than the European average.
Our ndings led to a reinterpretation of the European Paradox. Contrary to the EU Commis-
sion's assertions, but consistent with what was found by Dosi et al. (2005), our data suggested that
there is a gap in academic scientic production between Europe and the US. Our analysis revealed
that, having controlled for this gap and other factors, Europe is lagging behind the US in terms of
license income earned but not in terms of the number of license agreements concluded. While we
do not think that revenue generation should be the ultimate goal of TTOs, we note that US and
EU TTOs place equal emphasis on revenue generation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the determinants of TTO
productivity. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes dierences in TTO
organization and stang that might explain why European TTOs earn less license income than
their US counterparts. Section 5 concludes.
2 A review of the determinants of TTO productivity
University technology transfer oces are often seen as institutional bridges between universities
and industry (Siegel et al. 2003). Their role is to facilitate the transmission of university knowledge
to the economy.
Several studies have attempted to discern the factors aecting the productivity of TTOs, mea-
sured mainly in terms of number of licenses and license revenue (Thursby and Kemp, 2000; Siegel
4et al., 2003; Thursby et al., 2001; Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Friedman and Silberman, 2003; Lach
and Schankerman, 2003; Chapple et al., 2005; Belenzon and Schankerman, 2007; Macho-Stadler
et al., forthcoming). The majority of these studies have analyzed the functioning of TTOs in the
US. The interest in US university technology transfer is mainly driven by the \dramatic rise" in
university licensing since the passing of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. In recent years, university tech-
nology transfer has also gained momentum among policy-makers and economists in Europe. As
mentioned earlier, the European Commission in its communication \Improving knowledge transfer
between research institutions and industry across Europe: embracing open innovation { Imple-
menting the Lisbon Agenda" (2007), notes that Europe has been less successful than the US in
commercializing academic research results. An increasing number of studies have started investi-
gating the phenomenon of university technology transfer in Europe, mainly with analyses at the
country (Chapple et al., 2005) or academic institution level (Macho-Stadler et al., forthcoming).
Inter-country comparisons are still lacking due to lack of data. A notable exception is represented
by Siegel et al. (2008) who compare the relative performance of the UK TTOs relative to the US
ones, considering a multiplicity of output measures.
When examining the licensing activities of TTOs, economic literature has made a distinction
between TTO outputs and inputs. In the majority of cases, the number of licenses and license
revenue represent the outputs. The inputs are usually classied into four main categories.
The rst category includes the technology that is produced by an academic institution. As
mentioned above, TTOs are expected to work with university inventions and ensure that these are
disseminated in the economy. Measuring university technology is not an easy task, however, due
to dierent requirements in the US and EU, respectively. For example, some economists suggest
using the number of invention disclosures to measure university technology. This proxy seems
to work well in studies on US university technology transfer. In fact, in the US - at least in
principle - faculty members are required to disclose inventions to their TTOs. But this is not true
in Europe, where, in many cases, there are no formal requirements for academic scientists to disclose
inventions. Other economists suggest using the number of patents, but this measure has serious
drawbacks for a number of reasons. First, it is not clear whether patents are an input for licenses
or vice-versa. In fact, in many cases, patents are led only after a license is negotiated between
an academic institution and the industry counterpart. Moreover, as we realized by discussing the
matter with technology transfer professionals in Europe, TTOs often consider patents outputs per
se. Furthermore, licenses are not always backed by patents, as in the case of software technology.
Finally, in Europe, the drawback of using invention disclosures also applies here. Since academic
researchers are not usually required to disclose their inventions to academic TTOs, the latter do
5not always have a record of the patents led by the researchers at their institution. Chapple et al.
(2005) have suggested using total research income as a proxy for the stock of university technology
when analyzing the factors aecting TTO productivity in the UK.
The second category includes the characteristics of the academic institution in which a TTO
operates, namely the quality of the institution and its research orientation. The impact of quality on
university technology transfer is twofold. On the one hand, it aects the quality of the technology
that is being produced and, on the other hand, it impacts a company's \perception" of the quality
of university technology. As for the research orientation, Thursby and Kemp (2000) show that
institutions with a strong focus on engineering and life science tend to produce output that is more
easily transferred to the industry sector, either because of its applied nature or because industry
is interested in absorbing this output. However, life science inventions tend to represent a greater
share of the technology portfolio of TTOs relative to engineering inventions (Jensen and Thursby,
2001).
The third category encompasses the demand for technology in the academic institution's geo-
graphical area. The logic is that TTOs will nd it easier to conclude licensing agreements if there
is a local demand for them. Moreover, the presence of high-tech companies in the proximity of an
academic institution may have an inuence on the institution's output. This inuence, as noted by
Anselin et al. (1997) and Audretsch and Feldman (1996), is greater as the geographical proximity
of the academic institution and the high-tech companies increases.
The last category comprises the characteristics specic to a TTO, namely the number of sta
and their experience, the latter of which is measured by number of years since the foundation. It is
commonly believed that the relationship between TTO size and output is characterized by dimin-
ishing returns to scale. Thus, adding one sta positively aects the number of licenses and license
revenue, although the impact decreases with the number of sta added. Also, TTO experience is
usually found to have a positive eect on the output of a TTO, with a notable exception being
provided by Chapple et al. (2005).
There are, however, other factors that aect university technology transfer that have started
to be investigated only recently. These factors include TTO objectives, incentives, and sta skill
composition. TTO objectives are important in shaping the activities performed by these oces.
Their denition is often the result of the interplay between a number of institutions, including
national and local authorities, the academic administration, and the TTO itself. Belenzon and
Schankerman (2007) found that TTOs with strong local development objectives earn less revenue
from licenses and tend to conclude more license agreements with local startup companies. Belenzon
6and Shankerman (2007) have analyzed the role of incentive pay in TTO licensing activities and have
found that the adoption of incentive pay positively aects income earned from licenses. Finally,
sta skills are of crucial importance when analyzing TTO licensing activities. Interviews conducted
by Siegel et al. (2003) suggested that sta with experience in the industry sector might better
understand the needs and values of private companies. Conti et al. (2007) found evidence that
personnel with a PhD in science play an important role in facilitating communication between
academics and the TTO.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 The data
European data. This paper is based on a new survey of university technology transfer oces in
Europe conducted in summer 2008.
The pre-existing European data on university technology licensing are very limited. Most surveys
are national-based and thus limited in scope. There are two surveys from professional associations
covering several European countries. The survey from the Association of Science and Technology
professionals includes only 75 answers from universities in its 2007 edition. The Proton survey
includes more answers but presents severe problems concerning representativity, consistency, and
sample selection. Finally, none of these surveys has made their results publicly available at a
disaggregated level2, as is the case in the US.
The target population of our survey was TTOs of universities located in Western European
countries whose researchers published more than 200 scientic articles during the period 2004-2006.
Although there are a number of universities below that threshold, we expected that their technology
transfer output would be rather limited and that many of them may not have a technology transfer
oce anyway. A total of 351 universities met our eligibility requirements.
The contact persons for technology transfer were identied from university websites. The direc-
tors of the technology transfer oces were then contacted by telephone and invited to answer an
online questionnaire. In a small number of cases no contact person for technology transfer could
be identied; we suspected these cases to be universities that do not provide technology transfer
services to faculty.
The questionnaire included questions on objectives, metrics, organization, stang levels and
composition, and licensing outcomes3. To increase the response rate, we did not ask for the license
2The ASTP has made the anonymized results of its survey available to some researchers on request.
3The survey questions we used for this study are reported in Appendix A1.
7income directly but asked respondents into which category their license income fell4. Moreover,
we asked for the number of licenses, including the assignment contracts that regulate allocation
of intellectual property rights to industry partners. In fact, many of the TTOs in our population
associate assignment contracts with licenses and do not report them separately.
The response rate was 59.4% with 211 answers. We received answers from 15 countries with
four or more answers for each country. Figure 1 clearly shows that response rates are higher than
average for small countries such as Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, Finland, Portugal and
Ireland. The lowest response rates are for Germany with 27 answers out of 61 universities in the
target population (44.2%) and Italy with 23 out of 51 (46%).
In the rst part of the paper, we use information from those 163 respondents who had answered
the questions on the number of licenses, license income, total number of sta, and year of foundation
of a TTO. In the second part of the paper, where we explore the role of sta with experience in
industry, we reduce the sample to 157 respondents, excluding those who had not answered the
questions on the composition of the sta.
h Insert gure 1 about here i
US data. Data on university technology licensing in the US is readily available from the Associa-
tion University Technology Managers (AUTM) survey. We use the data from the publicly available
2008 AUTM survey, which includes answers from 141 US universities. The AUTM survey coverage
is excellent as it includes answers from 80% of US universities that have more than 200 scientic
publications in Science and Engineering. The AUTM survey focuses on the licensing activity of
technology transfer oces based mainly in the US. It includes questions on the number of licenses,
license revenue, number of the licensing sta, and the year of foundation of the TTOs.
The AUTM survey did not include some of the questions we were interested in. Thus we
contacted the respondents of the AUTM survey and asked them to answer a small number of
additional questions from our European survey. We sent the survey to the 154 TTOs who had
answered the 2007 AUTM survey. We received 89 answers out of the target population of 154
4Prior testing had shown that, despite our promise of condentiality, some respondents were unwilling to indicate
their exact license income, particularly if the latter was either very large or very small . The intervals were: less than
30,000 euros, between 30,000 and 100,000 euros, between 100,000 and 300,000 euros, between 300,000 and 1 million
euros and more than 1 million euros.
8respondents, i.e. a response rate of 58%. Of these answers, we used those 82 that provided
information on the composition of the sta.
In the rst part of the paper we use the full AUTM sample (i.e. all AUTM survey respondents),
and in the second part we use the results of our survey on US TTOs.
3.2 Descriptive statistics on licensing outcomes
It is interesting to rst consider the dierences in raw numbers between the US and Europe. Figure
2 shows a box plot of the number of licenses concluded by US and European universities in 2007.
The mean number of licenses for European universities is only 7.8 compared to 26.4 for the US. This
dierence is not due to just a small number of strong performers in the United States. In fact, the
median number of licenses for European universities is only 4 compared to 13 for US universities.
h Insert gure 2 about here i
Our measure for license income earned by US and in European TTOs in 2007 is represented
by license revenue gross of licensing costs5 The dierences in license income are equally striking.
Figure 3 shows the number of universities that earn license revenues in the relevant categories6.
Only 18 European universities have license revenues exceeding one million euros, whereas this is
the case for 75 US universities. At the other end of the distribution, 81 European universities have
license revenues below 30,000 euros, whereas this is the case for only 7 US universities.
h Insert gure 3 about here i
These raw numbers suggest a superior licensing performance by US universities, although the
explanation may be that US universities produce more knowledge or devote more eort to technology
licensing.
5The license income question that we posed to European TTOs is the same as that posed by the AUTM to US
TTOs.
6For US universities we knew the exact license income gures but we converted them into intervals to make them
comparable with European data. We used the 2007 yearly average exchange rate to convert the dollar amounts into
euros.
93.3 Econometric specications
While we adopted a standard linear regression model for the number of licenses, we performed an
interval regression analysis for the license income earned to take into account the fact that we did not
observe the exact value of license income but only the interval into which it falls. This methodology
allows also for the possibility that the observations are right-censored. In fact, as mentioned earlier,
we observed only that license income is greater or lower than the threshold value, 1.000.000 euros,
but we did not know what the upper bound was. Interval regression assumes that the data come
from a normal distribution. In our case, license income was not distributed normally, although we
can assume that its log follows a normal distribution. Therefore, if license income falls within our
survey categories, its log should fall within the logs of these categories.
Interval regression is a generalization of the censored regression model, where the latent variable,
y
i ; is expressed as a function of xi explanatory variables:
y
i = x0
i + ui with ui  N(0;2)
What we observe is yi = y
i if yiL  y
i  yiR and yiR = y
i if yiR  y
i .
All regressions are run with robust standard errors.
3.4 Determinants of licensing outcomes
Publication volume. As proxy for the pool of technologies available at an academic institution, we
used the number of articles in Science and Engineering. This measure also obviously controls for
the quality of the academic institution. For each university in our sample we collected the total
number of articles published in Science and Engineering during the period 2004-2006 by researchers
of the university, as reported in the ISI Web of Science.
Quality of the academic institution. We experimented with dierent measures of the quality
of the academic institutions7. In our preferred specication, we took the number of highly cited
scientists aliated with the university, as reported in the Shanghai world ranking of universities.
For those universities not listed in the ranking, we assumed that the number of highly cited scientists
is zero.
Orientation of the academic research. We controlled for biotechnology orientation of an academic
institution with the ratio of the number of top ten journal publications in the elds of medicine,
7As a robustness check, we used the total score in the Shanghai world ranking of universities or specic components
of that score other than that used in our preferred specication (publications in Nature and Science, number of sta
who have received the Nobel Prize or the Fields medal). All the dierent specications delivered similar results.
10biology, and chemistry to the number of top ten journal publications in the eld of engineering. We
selected the journals according to the total number of citations they had received, as reported by
the ISI Web of Science. Finally, we also controlled for whether the university has a medical school
or is a technology institute.
Age of TTO. For European universities we did not know the exact year in which the TTO was
created because in the survey we only asked for intervals (between 2003 and 2007, between 1997
and 2002, etc.). Thus, we created a discrete variable that takes increasing values for earlier years
of foundation8. The age variable is dened in such a way that the coecient of this variable in a
regression can be interpreted as the eect of one additional year of experience.
Professor's privilege. Several European countries used to have a law (commonly referred to
as "professor's privilege") according to which the intellectual property generated from university
inventions belonged to the researcher rather than to the university. The professor's privilege was
abolished in Germany (2001), in Norway (2002), in Denmark (2004) and in Finland (2007). How-
ever, it is still applicable in Sweden and was introduced in Italy in 2005. One implication of this
regime is that university researchers are under no obligation to even report licensing activities to
the technology transfer oce. To take this into account we constructed a dummy that assumes
the value one if the university is located in Sweden, Italy, or Finland. We included Finland in
the denition of the countries with professor's privilege since it abolished the privilege only very
recently. However, our results are robust to not including Finland in the denition of countries
with professor's privilege.
Demand for technology. We followed the economics of innovation practice of using patent in-
dicators to capture aspects of the innovative performance. We used the OECD regio database to
obtain the number of patent applications (EPO patent applications for European regions, USPTO
patent applications for US regions) at the regional level. The regional level is that of the "TL2"
which corresponds to a state in the US, a Land in Germany, etc. To ensure the comparability of
the regional patent counts between the US and Europe we adjusted the regional patent counts by
each country's propensity to patent (number of triadic patent families divided by the number of
national applications).
Stang level. For the US we knew how many licensing sta (full-time equivalents) were employed
by the TTO. For Europe, we knew the total sta in the TTO and the percentage of time they spend
on licensing, and by multiplying the two we obtained a measure equivalent to the US variable.
8The variable takes the value 3 if the TTO was created between 2003 and 2007, the value 8 if created between
1998 and 2002, 13 if created between 1993 and 1997, 18 if created between 1988 and 1992 and 23 if created earlier
than 1988.
113.5 Descriptive statistics on the independent variables
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the control variables, distinguishing between European and
US universities. Large dierences are apparent. The average US university in our sample produces
almost twice as many publications as the average European university in our sample. US universities
also have a greater orientation towards biotechnology, our index being twice as large for the US
than for Europe. Furthermore, the TTOs of US universities are older and tend to employ more
sta devoted to licensing than their European counterparts.
h Insert table 1 about here i
3.6 Sample representativity
In this section we investigated the representativity of our sample relative to its target population,
by comparing the characteristics of the sample with those of the corresponding target population.
Specically, we built a probit model where the dependent variable was one if a TTO was selected
in the sample from the target population. We then related the probability that a TTO was selected
in the sample to a number of characteristics of the university to which the TTO was aliated. The
characteristics we considered include the number of scientic articles in the period 2004-2006, the
number of highly cited scientists (provided by the Shanghai world ranking of universities), whether
the university is a Technology institute, and whether it has a medical school.
We present the results separately for European and US TTOs. As already specied, the target
population comprised TTOs of universities whose researchers published more than 200 scientic
articles during the period 2004-2006. Moreover, the sample of European TTOs encompassed those
163 survey respondents who had provided an answer to the questions on license outcomes, sta,
and year of establishment of a TTO. Finally, the sample of US TTOs included the respondents to
the 2008 AUTM survey, whose university had satised the criterion of 200 scientic articles during
the period 2004-2006.
Table 2 shows that the characteristics of the European sample did not signicantly dier from
those of the corresponding target population. In fact, none of the characteristics we included in
the regression below were statistically signicant. On the contrary, our sample of US TTOs over-
represented high quality universities, the coecient for the Shanghai score on highly cited scientists
being positive and statistically signicant. This result needs not to be a source of concern, however;
in our regressions, as shown in the next tables, we always controlled for the quality of the academic
institutions.
h Insert table 2 about here i
123.7 Results
The results of the regression on the number of licenses are given in Table 3. Without controls
(column I), the coecient of US was large and signicant.
Once we control for the quantity, quality and composition of the research as well as demand for
technology (column II), the coecient of US drops from 1.124 to 0.567 but remains signicant at
the 1% condence level. This suggests that factors external to the TTO account for around half
of the observed dierence in the number of licenses, which is consistent with the observation that
US universities produce more publications and employ more stars than European universities. The
controls for quality and composition of the research Publications, Bio orientation, Shanghai score
on hici are all positive and signicant at the 1% level. Location in a technology institute has a
positive impact and signicant on the number of licenses concluded by a TTO. Having a medical
school increases the number of licenses but not signicantly so. Regional demand for technology is
not signicant.
Once we controlled for the quantity, quality, and composition of the research, as well as demand
for technology (column II), the coecient of US dropped from 1.124 to 0.567 but remained signicant
at the 1% condence level. This suggests that factors external to the TTO account for around half
of the observed dierence in the number of licenses, which is consistent with the observation that
US universities produce more publications and employ more stars than European universities. The
controls for quality and composition of the research Publications, Bio orientation, Shanghai score
on hici were all positive and signicant at the 1% level. Location in a technology institute had a
positive and signicant impact on the number of licenses concluded by a TTO. Having a medical
school increased the number of licenses but not signicantly so. Regional demand for technology
was not signicant.
h Insert table 3 about here i
In column III, we controlled for countries that either apply the professor's privilege (Italy and
Sweden) or that have recently abolished it (Finland). The impact of Professor's privilege was
negative and statistically signicant. Taking it into account reduced the coecient of US further.
In column IV we included the age of the TTO and the number of sta employed in licensing.
This specication constitutes our preferred, or baseline, regression. As expected, the eect of Sta
(expressed in log) and Age on the number of licenses concluded by a TTO was positive and highly
signicant. As a result of adding these controls, the coecient of US became small and no longer
13signicant. Thus, the remaining dierence between US and European universities was explained
by the fact that US universities have more experience in technology transfer and more personnel
devoted to licensing activities.
In the last column, we introduced an interaction eect between US and Sta to allow for the
possibility that US TTO employees are more productive than their European counterparts, which
did not appear to be the case.
The regression results lead us to conclude that there is no great dierence between US and
European university TTOs when we consider the number of licenses and control for the relevant
inputs. Almost all of the observed dierence in the number of licenses executed could be explained
by dierences in inputs to the technology transfer process. We now turn to licensing income and
repeat the same exercise.
h Insert table 4 about here i
In column I, we only regressed license income on the US dummy and found a very large and
signicant eect. In column II, we include our proxies for the quantity, quality, and composition
of the research and the demand for technology. Having added these controls, the coecient of
US dropped from 3.366 to 2.037 but remained large and highly signicant. As expected, the
coecients of Publications and Shanghai score on hici were statistically signicant at the 1% level.
Medical school and Bio orientation did not appear to have an eect on license income. Highly cited
biologists are a very important fraction of highly cited scientists. Thus the life science eect may
go through Shanghai score on hici especially if leading edge biomedical research is more important
for license income performance. The coecient on regional patents was positive and signicant in
the specication of column II and in some of the subsequent specications, which contrasts with
what we found when analyzing the number of licenses.
In column III we included the dummy Professor's privilege whose coecient, as before, was
negative and statistically signicant. Once again, the coecient of US decreased but remained
signicant.
Column IV presents the regressions results when the variables Sta (expressed in log) and Age
are added to the model. Their coecients were positive and signicant at the 1% level. Having
added these controls caused the coecient of US to fall from 1.9 to 1.3 without, however, aecting
its statistical signicance.
14As before, we included the interaction terms between US and Sta in column V. The interaction
term was signicant at the 10% condence level; the eect of sta on license income thus seemsed
to be larger in US universities. An interesting potential explanation for this result is that US
universities may employ sta with higher levels of human capital. We pursue this hypothesis in
section 4 by considering business experience of TTO employees.
Finally, as a robustness check, we conducted a thought experiment whereby we compare the ob-
served number of licenses for European with the counterfactual created by applying US coecients
to European Universities. Unfortunately, we could not apply the same method to licensing income
due to the limitations of our license income data 9. The experiment consisted of running the regres-
sions on US universities only and then make out-of-sample predictions for European universities.
This technique has been employed in labor economics to analyze male-female wage dierentials
(Malkiel & Malkiel 1973).
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The rst two rows of table 5 display the number of licenses in logs for EU universities ( LEU =
1:839) and US universities ( LUS = 2:744), leading to an observed mean dierence of ( LUS    LEU =
0:905). The next two rows show the number of licenses predicted by applying US coecients to
US universities. In one case we ran the US regressions only with factors external to the TTO
(~ LEU = 2:218) and in another we ran the US regressions with both external factors, sta and age
(^ LEU = 1:922). We could then use these predictions to decompose the observed mean dierence
into separate components. 58% of the observed mean dierence between the US and Europe could
be attributed to factors external to the TTO and 90.8% to external factors, age and sta. The
result of the application of this method was thus completely consistent with our earlier nding that
observable TTO inputs account for almost the entire US-EU dierential in the number of licenses.
3.8 Heterogeneity within Europe
In our analysis, we implicitly assumed that Europe was an homogeneous group. Even though we
took into account the professor's privilege, cross-national dierences may go beyond regulations
concerning intellectual property ownership. While we did not have sucient data to analyze cross-
national dierences within Europe in detail, introducing country-xed eects in our regressions may
provide some clues.
9We did not know the exact license income earned and for the top performers we only know that their license
income was above one million euros.
15Table 6 presents the regressions for the number of licenses (Column I) and license income (Col-
umn II), having introduced country-xed eects. Switzerland and Belgium appeared to outperform
the rest of the European countries in terms of both the number of licenses executed and license
income earned. Their coecients were positive and statistically signicant in the regression for
the number of licenses, indicating that Belgian and Swiss TTOs performed better than their US
counterparts relative to the number of licenses executed. At the other end of the distribution,
Finland, Italy and Sweden executed fewer licenses than the other European countries and the US,
while Sweden, Norway and Austria earned the least in terms of license income.
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4 Exploring the source of the license income dierential be-
tween the US and Europe
As we have shown in the previous section, European TTOs earn less income from licenses than
their US counterparts, having controlled for academic quality and research orientation, demand for
technology and TTOs characteristics.
In this section we present evidence on dierences between the organization of European and
US TTOs that might explain why European TTOs earn less license income. We conjecture the
following two hypotheses: 1) US TTOs might be more oriented towards generating revenue than
their European counterparts; 2) US might employ more sta with experience in the industry sector
than their European counterparts. These hypotheses were formulated after discussions we had with
technology transfer representatives in Europe and in conforming to the literature on objectives and
incentives at US TTOs. The rationale for the two hypotheses is the following. If generating
revenue is a TTO's primary objective, then it will focus on negotiating those licenses that ensure
higher revenue rather than maximizing the number of licenses negotiated. Moreover, sta with
experience in the industry sector may be more apt at negotiating licenses with private companies
and, especially, nancial clauses.
In this analysis we made use of 157 answers by European TTOs and 82 by US TTOs.
To test the rst hypothesis we provided qualitative evidence based on the answers furnished by
the TTO respondents in the US and in Europe. The rationale for the qualitative analysis stands in
the acknowledgment that introducing any variable capturing the importance of generating revenue
as an objective in the regression for license income entails serious problems of endogeneity. Of
16course, a TTO that does not earn a large license revenue would be tempted to say that generating
revenue is not an important objective. On the contrary, to test the second hypothesis, we used
a quantitative approach and included in our regression for license income our proxy for a TTO
industry experience.
4.1 Objectives and metrics of success
US and European TTOs were asked to evaluate the following objectives: 1) promote diusion of
scientic knowledge and technology; 2) generate revenues; 3) promote local economic development;
4) promote national economic development; 5) attract and retain faculty through quality of technol-
ogy transfer services. We used a 5-point Likert scale ranging from \not important" to \extremely
important". Our prior was that US TTOs tend to focus more on \generating revenue" than their
European counterparts.
The results of the survey showed that, in absolute terms, US TTOs tended to place a greater
value on the objective of \generating revenue" than their European counterparts. In fact, the
percentage of US TTOs indicating that \generating revenue" is either important, very important
or extremely important was 80.7%, while the same percentage in Europe was 72.9%10.
However, relative to their European counterparts, US TTOs did not place more importance on
generating revenue than they did on \promoting local development" and \attracting and retaining
faculty". In fact, table 4 shows that the percentage of TTOs that indicated that \generating rev-
enue" is more important than \promoting local development" was very similar for US and Europe.
However, the percentage of respondents estimating that \generating revenue" was less important
than \promoting local development" was greater in the US than in Europe. Similar results were ob-
tained, when comparing the objective of \generating revenue" with that of \attracting and retaining
faculty".
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We also asked TTOs to evaluate the following metrics of success: 1) license income; 2) number
of licenses/options executed; 3) number of patents awarded; 4) number of startups established.
In absolute terms, US respondents attached more importance to license income than did their
European counterparts. In fact, 86.4% of the US respondents declared that license income was
either important, very important or extremely important, while in Europe this percentage was
10The percentage of total respondents who indicated that \generating revenue" was either very important or
extremely important was 42.1% for US TTOs and 33.8% or European TTOs.
1771.4%11. These results were in line with what we found for the importance of \generating revenue"
as an objective, which seems to be more relevant, in absolute terms, to US TTOs than to European
ones.
In relative terms, US TTOs attached less importance than their European counterparts to license
income when compared to the number of licenses negotiated and the number of startups created.
However, US TTOs attached more importance than their European colleagues to license income
relative to the number of patents led.
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4.2 Sta with experience in the industry sector
Our second hypothesis was that US technology transfer professionals are more experienced at negoti-
ating the nancial clauses of licensing contracts. Very often in discussions with academic researchers
and rms in Europe, we heard anecdotes about TTO personnel lacking adequate experience to ne-
gotiate with companies because of their insucient comprehension of industry logic and goals
To verify whether US technology transfer professionals are more experienced at negotiating
licenses, we decided to include in our survey two questions asking whether the head of a TTO had
at least ve years of experience in industry and how many licensing sta members had at least ve
years of experience in industry. The logic behind these questions was that TTO sta members with
experience in industry would be more acquainted with the goals and the modus operandi of private
companies than would sta members with no such experience. Moreover, the question relative to
the head of a TTO was motivated on the basis that the goals and the activities a TTO pursues can
be inuenced, at least in part, by the convictions of their head.
The results of our survey revealed clearly that the TTO sta (including the director) in the US
had more experience in industry than did the TTO sta (including the director) in Europe. 77% of
the US respondents declared that the head of their TTO had at least ve years experience, while
in Europe this percentage was 43%. Moreover, the US respondents had an average of 2.6 licensing
sta with experience in industry, while Europe had an average of only 0.8.
In table 9, column II, we added to the regression on license income a dummy equal to one if
the head of a TTO had at least ve years of experience in industry. As expected, the coecient
11The percentage of respondents who indicated that license income was either very important or extremely impor-
tant, was higher in the US (50%) than in Europe (40%).
18for business director was positive and signicant at the 5% signicance level. Taking into account
the industry experience of a TTO director reduced the coecient of the US dummy by 14%. In
column III, we used the number of sta with at least ve years of experience in industry as a proxy
for TTO industry experience. Again, the coecient of business sta was positive and signicant
and the coecient of the US dummy declined by 21% to 0.9012.
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The econometric results seemed to conrm our hypothesis that TTO experience in industry is
important when negotiating license contracts, especially nancial clauses. As we have shown, in-
cluding our proxies for industry experience entailed a decline in the US dummy coecient. However,
the latter remained positive and statistically signicant. Surely, the proxies we adopted control only
imperfectly for the TTO sta experience in industry. The eect of business experience would be
larger if we had been able to take into account the dierent types of experience TTO sta had ac-
quired in industry. An examination the CVs (available on line) of TTO directors in the US revealed
that some TTO directors had launched their own companies prior to joining the TTO, while others
were licensing executives for major companies13.
5 Concluding Remarks
Combining new survey data on university technology transfer oces in Europe together with public
information available on both US and European universities, we investigated whether US technol-
ogy transfer oces conclude more licenses and earn more license revenue than their European
counterparts.
Our rst result showed that, having controlled for the quality of the academic institutions, their
research orientation, the number of publications, the local demand for technology and TTO sta,
and age, we could not conclude that US TTOs make more license agreements than their European
counterparts. In fact, the coecient of the US dummy was small and insignicant.
12As a robustness check, we included the variables business sta and business director in the regression for the
number of licenses. None of these variables was statistically signicant, conrming our prior suspicion that the role
of industry is especially important for the negotiation of the nancial clauses of a license.
13The head of the TTO of MIT spent 20 years in industry, primarily in the elds of membrane separations, medical
devices, and biotechnology at such companies as Amicon, Millipore and Applied Biotechnology. The head of the
TTO of Emory University, served as in-house patent counsel for an international pharmaceutical corporation for
seven years. The head of the TTO of the University of Vermont had ten year of experience in the Science and
Medical Products Divisions of Corning Glass works. The head of the TTO of Boston University had co-founded two
companies: Kytogenics Inc. and Genmap Inc.
19Our second result showed that, having controlled for the same factors as for the number of
licenses, US technology transfer oces earned more revenue from licenses than their European
counterparts. The coecient of our US dummy was positive and highly signicant. Our controls
explained two thirds of the dierence in license income earned between the US and Europe.
The situation in Europe did not prove to be homogeneous. Switzerland and Belgium outper-
formed the other European countries, whereas Italy and Finland underperformed the rest of Europe
in terms of the number of licenses, and Austria and Norway in terms of license income earned. An
in-depth investigation of the origins of cross-country dierences was beyond the scope of this paper
but is an important avenue for future research.
We conjectured that US TTOs have more sta with experience in industry, which makes them
both better at understanding the modus operandi of rms and more skilled at negotiating the
nancial clauses of licensing contracts. Our proxies for TTO business experience had a positive
and statistically signicant impact on license revenue earned by TTO and entailed a decline in the
US dummy coecient. Moreover, we speculated that US TTOs tend to place more importance
on the objective of \generating revenue" than their European counterparts and, therefore, have
more incentive to negotiate licenses that potentially generate high revenue. Here, the evidence was
mixed. In absolute terms, US TTOs tended to place more importance on generating revenue than
European TTOs. However, they did not place more importance than European TTOs on revenue
generation relative to other objectives, such as local development and faculty service.
We believe our analysis helps to clarify the debate on the \European Paradox". To the best
of our knowledge, we are the rst to employ micro-level evidence to analyze transatlantic dier-
ences in licensing performance. Our ndings highlight the importance of university inputs, such as
publications, and of TTO size and experience as factors explaining the gap between the US and
Europe in terms of number of licenses concluded. As for license revenue, these factors are still very
important but leave part of the dierence between the US and Europe unexplained.
The dierent performance in terms of license income need not in itself be a source of concern.
There is nothing in economic theory to suggest that TTOs should maximize license revenue. So-
cial welfare might be better served by TTOs facilitating local economic development or helping to
translate academic research into products. However, to the extent that revenue generation is an
objective (and many TTOs say it is), policy changes are advisable to close the gap between the
US and Europe. Preliminary evidence points to the usefulness of industry experience in negoti-
ating licenses, especially nancial clauses. The optimal composition of a TTO and the nature of
organizational practices that TTOs should employ remain a subject for further research.
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B Survey Questions
Questions asked to EU TTOs only
1. When was your oce established originally (CHOOSE ONE OF THE OPTIONS BELOW)?
 In the last 5 years (2002 -2007)
 Between 5 and 10 years ago (1997-2001)
 Between 10 and 15 years ago (1992-1996)
 Between 15 and 20 years ago (1987-1991)
 More than 20 years ago
2. How many licenses/options did your OFFICE execute last year (include exclusive AND non-
exclusive licenses/options, assignments and software licenses)?
3. What was the total amount of license income earned from university intellectual property
(EUR)?
 0 - 29,000
 30,000 - 99,000
 100,000 - 299,000
 300,000 - More than 1,000, 000
Questions asked to EU AND US TTOs
1. At present, approximately how many employees (full time equivalents) are in your oce?
2. Among employees (full time equivalents) how many have an experience in the industry sector
of AT LEAST FIVE years?
233. Please indicate the percentage of time your OFFICE spends approximately on the activities
below. (THE TOTAL HAS TO SUM TO 100%)
 Assessing the patentability of inventions, applying for patents and negotiating and man-
aging licenses
 Negotiating and managing research contracts and/or grants (regional, national, EU)
 Supporting start-up companies (excluding activities in A and including for example as-
sessing the opportunity for a technology to be commercialized with a start-up, providing
contacts with venture capitalists, support in the design of the business plan...)
 Increasing awareness among academic researchers and industry of technology transfer
opportunities (organization of courses, workshops, participation in workshops...)
 Others (managing data ows, designing technology transfer policies...)
4. In your opinion, what are the main objectives your OFFICE pursues when engaging in tech-
nology transfer activities? Please indicate the degree of importance attached to the objectives
below.
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5. We are interested in how you measure the success of your TTO. How important to you are
the following measures of success? Please indicate the degree of importance attached to the
measures of success below.
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C Correlation Table
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24Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Europe (n=163) US (n=141)
Variable: Mean St.Dev. Min Max Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Publications (thousands) 2.354 1.910 0 8893 4.478 4.098 0.117 26.366
Shanghai score on hici 6.768 8.810 0 40.6 20.713 18.519 0 100
Bio orientation 0.060 0.1861 0 0.963 0.130 0.252 0 0.992
Technology institute 0.080 0.272 0 1 0.057 0.232 0 1
Medical School 0.031 0.173 0 1 0.106 0.309 0 1
Professor's Privilege 0.215 0.412 0 1 0 - 0 0
Regional patents 154.091 264.612 0 163 1633.229 480.468 614.335 11.461 4052.206
Sta 2.237 2.642 0 24 5.184 5.104 0 37
Age 9.932 6.195 3 23 17.539 6.003 3 23
Table 2a: likelihood of inclusion in the sample
(1) (2)
US EU
# of universities with more than 200
scientic publications between 2004 and 2006 185 358
# of useable answers 141 163
Useable answer as % 76.63% 45.53%
Table 2b: Probit estimation of the likelihood of inclusion in the sample
(1) (2)
US EU
D=1 if we have a useable answer
Publications -0.008 0.038
[0.006] [0.023]
Technology institute 0.039 -0.069
[0.129] [0.090]
Medical school 0.126 -0.076
[0.078] [0.139]




*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets
25Table 3: Results on the number of licenses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
licenses licenses licenses licenses licenses
(in logs) (in logs) (in logs) (in logs) (in logs)
US 1.124*** 0.567*** 0.375*** 0.076 -0.066
[0.132] [0.123] [0.125] [0.114] [0.232]
Publications 0.115*** 0.135*** 0.066** 0.063**
[0.038] [0.038] [0.031] [0.031]
Technology institute 0.579*** 0.591*** 0.459*** 0.475***
[0.216] [0.201] [0.173] [0.177]
Medical school 0.080 0.129 0.132 0.133
[0.174] [0.162] [0.158] [0.158]
Regional patents 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Bio orientation 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Shanghai score on hici 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.012** 0.012**
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]




Sta (in logs) 0.598*** 0.547***
[0.110] [0.129]
Sta (in logs) interacted with US 0.120
[0.161]
Constant 1.658*** 1.142*** 1.332*** 0.561*** 0.631***
[0.085] [0.104] [0.106] [0.126] [0.165]
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
R2 0.196 0.482 0.531 0.614 0.615
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 5: Using US coecients to predict EU licensing outcomes
Observed # of licenses in logs- EU universities  LEU 1.839
Observed # of licenses in logs- US universities  LUS 2.744
Predicted # of licenses in logs for EU universities with US coecients,
regressions with factors external to the TTO
~ LEU 2.218
Predicted # of licenses in logs for EU universities with US coecients
regressions with factors external to the TTO, age and sta
^ LEU 1.922
Observed mean dierence  LUS    LEU 0.905
Percentage of the observed mean dierence
explained by factors external to the TTO ( LUS   ~ LEU)=( LUS    LEU) 58.1%
Percentage of the observed mean dierence
explained by factors external to the TTO, age and sta ( LUS   ^ LEU)=( LUS    LEU) 90.8%
Note: To ensure consistency with the rest of the analysis, universities from EU countries with professor's privilege
(Sweden, Norway and Finland) were excluded from the comparison because the coecient for professor's privilege
cannot be estimated from US data alone.
28Table 6: exploring heterogeneity within Europe
licenses (in logs) license income (intervals, in logs)
Publications 0.054* 0.151*
[0.030] [0.085]
Technology institute 0.358** 0.321
[0.176] [0.399]
Medical school 0.180 0.272
[0.154] [0.419]
Regional patents -0.000 0.001
[0.000] [0.000]
Bio orientation 0.002** 0.002
[0.001] [0.003]


































United Kingdom -0.203 -0.732*
[0.181] [0.385]





Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 7: Relative importance of objectives
EU US
Generating revenue is more important than promoting local development 20.5% 21.3%
Generating revenue is equally important than promoting local development 34.8% 27.0%
Generating revenue is less important than promoting local development 44.7% 51.7%
Generating revenue is more important than attract and retain faculty 24.8% 24.7%
Generating revenue is equally important than attract and retain faculty 31.4% 28.1%
Generating revenue is less important than attract and retain faculty 43.8% 47.2%
Table 8: Relative importance of metrics of success
EU US
License income is more important than # licenses 27.5% 19.5%
License income is equally important than # licenses 51.4% 47.2%
License income is less important than # licenses 29.1% 41.6%
License income is more important than # startups 26.2% 22.5%
License income is equally important than # startups 31.4% 39.3%
License income is less important than # startups 42.4% 38.2%
License income is more important than # patents 32.4% 48.3%
License income is equally important than # patents 36.7% 38.2%
License income is less important than # patents 30.9% 13.5%
30Table 9: Licensing income and business experience of TTO directors and sta
(1) (2) (3)
license income license income license income
(intervals, in logs) (intervals, in logs) (intervals, in logs)
US 1.136*** 0.978*** 0.902***
[0.326] [0.335] [0.349]
Publications 0.215** 0.235** 0.226**
[0.108] [0.107] [0.105]
Technology institute 0.147 0.239 0.170
[0.496] [0.500] [0.496]
Medical school 0.062 0.043 0.001
[0.512] [0.462] [0.485]
Regional patents 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Bio orientation 0.001 0.002 0.002
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Shanghai score on hici 0.049** 0.043** 0.043**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Professor's privilege -1.325*** -1.295*** -1.302***
[0.479] [0.494] [0.481]
Age 0.043* 0.050** 0.040*
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023]






Constant 8.817*** 8.515*** 8.903***
[0.437] [0.454] [0.439]
Observations 239 239 239
McFadden R2 0.229 0.235 0.232
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Attract and retain faculty through
quality of tech transfer services
Others (please specify)













# of licenses/options executed
# of research contracts/grants executed
# of patents awarded





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Respondents by country
35Figure 2: Distribution of the number of licenses
36Figure 3: Distribution of license income
37